E.2d at 689 (refusing “to hold that the words ‘with any child’ ” require a defendant to be “within a certain distance of, or in close proximity to the child”); see also United States v. Code 18.2 § 18.2–370 (punishing indecent exposure when done “with any child ” (emphasis added)); Wyo. § 14–3–105(a) (providing, in pertinent part, “any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child ․ is guilty of a felony.” (emphasis added)).7.
Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. No matter; the defendant does not question that “criminal offense” in section 2422(b) includes state crimes. In none was the question that this appeal presents raised. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1235–36 (11th Cir.2002), and United States v. Since a webcam did not place him in the presence of “elliegirl1234,” Taylor could not have been convicted of that offense. So, under that reading, a salacious letter that directed the minor to masturbate would be a crime.
Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 564–65 (9th Cir.2004), although the statute does not say so, unlike the RICO statute, which does. The government relied on two Indiana offenses to convict the defendant: “touch[ing] or fondl[ing] the person's own body ․ in the presence of a child less than fourteen (14) years of age with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the child or the older person,” Ind. The implication that Congress regards “sexual activity” as a synonym for “sexual act” is further supported by the fact that the statute brackets “sexual activity” with “prostitution,” which involves physical contact. The government argues that as a matter of ordinary usage, “sexual activity” includes masturbation. She said she had no webcam.)The government acknowledges that “sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense” is explicitly defined to include producing child pornography. In one the court treated “sexual activity” as a synonym for “sexual acts.” United States v. Tello, 600 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir.2010), the defendant intended to have sexual intercourse with the (supposed) girl that he met in the chat room, and he actually traveled to meet her. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.2007), a case not cited by the government, is similar to Root and Tello: the defendant traveled in order to meet and have sex with the supposed minor. The next issue is whether Taylor could have been convicted under Indiana law for solicitation. The other construction would mean that the solicitation would have to be for fondling with the adult.
Mannava, 565 F.3d 412, 414–15 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Congress cannot know in advance what conduct the state will decide to make criminal: if Indiana made leering a crime, and “sexual activity” were defined as broadly as the U. Attorney asks us to define it in this case, a minor offense would subject the offender to a 10–year minimum prison sentence. Last the government cites cases in which courts have referred to masturbation as a form of sexual activity. 424 (10th Cir.2005), involved facts similar to those of this case, but again masturbation was merely assumed to be sexual activity within the meaning of section 2422(b). “[T]he tie must go to the defendant.” United States v. In sum, for Taylor to be convicted of fondling under § 35–42–4–5, the government had to prove that he was in the presence of a child. The first way would proscribe any solicitation of a child to fondle herself, even if it is at a location and time apart from the adult.
Benson (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Hammond, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellee. Martin (argued), Attorney, Viniyanka Prasad, Attorney, Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc., Hammond, IN, for Defendant–Appellant. The cases hold (though more often just assume) that the “criminal offense” to which the statute refers can be a state rather than a federal crime, United States v. For a federal statute to fix the sentence for a violation of a broad category of conduct criminalized by state law, such as “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” is a questionable practice. Explicitly defining sexual activity to include producing child pornography was needed only if the term “sexual activity” requires contact, since the creation of pornography doesn't involve contact between the pornographer and another person; this is further evidence that “sexual activity” as used in the federal criminal code does require contact. 3 (7th Cir.2008)—another case factually similar to the present one—the question of the meaning of the term “sexual activity” in section 2422(b) was neither raised by the appellant nor answered by the court. But when there are two equally plausible interpretations of a criminal statute, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the more lenient one. It has not qualified the term with “actual or constructive,” and if the term “presence” is expanded to include constructive and actual presence, that development should not come from the courts, especially the federal courts. Under Indiana law, a person is guilty of soliciting a minor if the person “solicits” the child “to engage in (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual conduct; or (3) any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person.” Ind. There are two ways to read the statute: does the solicitation have to be for “fondling” or “touching” with the other person, or does simply instructing a person to do so apart from the adult qualify.
In that context, a perpetrator must steal something from the other person's presence. Code § 35–42–5–1 (defining robbery as the taking of “property from another person or from the presence of another person”). One Indiana court has stressed that the element of presence does not mean the minor has to know about the fondling; all it requires is that the child “be at the place where the defendant's conduct occurs.” Baumgartner v. When Taylor and “elliegirl1234” communicated over Instant Messenger they were not in one another's presence. And it would not reach the situation of the salacious letter. Of course, the government is not obliged to wait for Indiana to have a case on point before it can charge Taylor with a crime under § 2422, but when Congress chooses to define a crime by state law, federal prosecutors cannot exceed the scope of the state law and seek to punish conduct that is not illegal under the statutes listed in the indictment—even though the conduct is extremely disturbing. The legislature has to specifically address this lamentable behavior and determine what the law truly proscribes. 301 (2010) (a thorough article surveying the problem and offering suggestions for the legislature).